

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00080 011539Z

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SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OCTOBER 1, 1974

(SALT TWO-450)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1974.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
OCTOBER 1, 1974

MR. MINISTER,

I

TODAY I WILL PRESENT SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE BASIC ELEMENTS WHICH OUR TWO
DELEGATIONS NEED TO ADDRESS IN OUR EFFORT TO EXPLORE WAYS TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00080 011539Z

LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

II

TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WE MUST WORK OUT A FRAME-
WORK FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT IS EQUITABLE FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS
TASK IS NOT EASY. THE DIFFERENCES IN THE STRUCTURE AND CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES
MAKE COMPARISONS DIFFICULT. YET WITH MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO
SUCCEED AND MUTUAL WILLINGNESS TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS, WE SHOULD BE
ABLE TO ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, EQUITABLE FOR
EACH OF US.

AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT IS ONE THAT DOES NOT PERMIT EITHER SIDE
TO OBTAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT
IS ONE THAT RECOGNIZES EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT IS THUS ONE THAT THROUGH QUANTITATIVE
AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS PROVIDES FOR AN OVER-ALL BALANCE IN
THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT IS ONE THAT SERVES TO STABILIZE THE
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. TO STABILIZE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
MEANS TO BRING A HALT TO A CONTINUING SPIRAL IN THE STRATEGIC
ARMS COMPETITION. IT MEANS TO REDUCE UNCERTAINTIES OVER DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE. IT
MEANS TO BUILD UP GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE OVER WHAT CHANGES ARE
TO BE EXPECTED. WE NEED TO WORK OUT AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WHICH
WILL PRESERVE A BALANCE IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP FOR THE
PERIOD OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE WHAT COULD
BE A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR LIMITATIONS IN THE LONGER TERM. TO
ENSURE THIS BALANCE, WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD ENCOMPASS
NOT ONLY CURRENT STRATEGIC FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, BUT ALSO PROSPECTIVE
FORCES OF EACH SIDE.

III

TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE,
THERE NEEDS TO BE A BALANCE IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.
A BALANCE DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES
WOULD HAVE TO BE IDENTICAL TO EACH OTHER. SUCH A COURSE IS NOT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00080 011539Z

FEASIBLE FOR MANY REASONS. IT DOES MEAN THAT WHEN THE TOTALITY
OF STRATEGIC FORCES ON BOTH SIDES ARE WEIGHED, IN BOTH QUANTIT-
ATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TERMS, THEY MUST BE IN OVER-ALL BALANCE.

THIS BALANCE IS PARTICULARLY DETERMINED BY THE OFFENSIVE
SYSTEMS THAT CARRY THE PREPONDERANCE OF DESTRUCTIVE NUCLEAR
POWER, NAMELY, ICBM, AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

IN NEGOTIATING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE ABM TREATY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF ICMB AND SLBM LAUNCHERS. BY AGREEING TO PLACE CERTAIN LIMITS ON THESE TWO SYSTEMS, OUR GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZED THE FORMIDABLE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITIES OF THESE ARMS. IN THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE AND PARTICULARLY IN THEIR POTENTIAL TO ATTACK AND RETALIATORY FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE, THESE ARMS DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS LIMITATION WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE IN ACCORD THAT HEAVY BOMBERS, WITH THEIR POTENTIAL CAPABILITY TO DELIVER SUBSTANTIAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER OVER AN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION.

THUS THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT ANY AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THESE THREE SYSTEMS, THAT IS, ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

IV

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THESE THREE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT IS NECESSARY AND IMPORTANT THAT LIMITATIONS BE PLACED ON THEIR MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS--THAT IS, THEIR QUANTITY, THEIR THROW-WEIGHT AND THEIR MIRV CAPABILITY.

WITH REGARD TO QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT EQUIVALENCE IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THAT IS, ICMB LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, IS BEST ACHIEVED THROUGH PHASED MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD RESULT IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMON LOW LEVEL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00080 011539Z

V

OUR GOVERNMENTS ALSO AGREE THAT A QUANTITATIVE BALANCE IN ITSELF WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT. IN WORKING OUT AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE FOR AN ENDURING AND STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ADDRESS QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS AS WELL.

AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMON LOWER LEVEL IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, BUT FAILED TO CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL OF THEIR DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY, WOULD LEAVE UNCHECKED AND IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF THE ARMS COMPETITION. THUS, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER TO CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL DES-

TRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITATIONS ON THROW-WEIGHT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOMBER PAYLOAD.

HOWEVER, EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS AND ON THE THROU-WEIGHT OF THESE SYSTEMS WOULD BY THEMSELVES FAIL TO ENSURE AND ENDURING STRATEGIC BALANCE FOR THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THUS, WE SHOULD ESTABLISH FURTHER QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS.

IN THE PAST WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING EFFECTS ON THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES OF UNCONSTRAINED DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS. MIRVS CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION OF POTENTIALLY GREAT UNCERTAINTY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SUCH UNCERTAINTY OVER THE FUTURE CAPABILITY OF ONE SIDE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE OTHER SIDE IN ITS FORCE PLANNING.

THUS, MR. MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES AFFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE OF LIMITING QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILE LAUNCHERS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THROW-WEIGHT AND THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES OF PERMITTED MIRV SYSTEMS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 SALT T 00080 011539Z

VI

MR. MINISTER, IN PRESENTING TODAY A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW AGREEMENT TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES UNTIL 1985, I HAVE OUTLINED THE NEED OF BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE SET FORTH OUR POSITION THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--NAMELY, ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS; THAT WE BELIEVE EQUIVALENCE IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF THESE THREE SYSTEMS CAN BE BEST ACHIEVED THROUGH PHASED MUTUAL REDUCTIONS TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMON LOWER LEVEL; THAT TO CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF THOSE SYSTEMS, THESE SHOULD BE LIMITATIONS ON THROW-WEIGHT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOMBER PAYLOAN; AND THAT IN ADDITION THERE SHOULD BE LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILS LAUNCHERS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THROW-WEIGHT AND NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES OF PERMITTED MIRVED SYSTEMS.

WE WOULD WELCOME HEARING THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONCERNING THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT I HAVVE PRESENTED TODAY.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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